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IN THE SUPREME COURT
· of the
STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE J. ANDERSON
(PLUCKARD)
Respondent,
Case No. 8857

vs.
LaMAR ANDERSON
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the
Honorable Martin M. Larsen, District Judge, in the
sum of $13,838.63 for alleged unpaid support money
(R. 203, Vol. 2).

The Appellant was the Defendant, and the Respondent the Plaintiff in the court below and will hereafter
be· referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant.

STATEMENT OF F A·CTS
From the marriage of these parties, which was dissolved on September 2·6, 1949, four children were born.
The youngest child, Michele is now age 13 years, Brent
1
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is now age 16, Diane will be 18 years of age November
29, 1958, and Craig, the oldest, is now 19 years of age,
not living with his mother and is self supporting.
On the lOth day of September, 1949, in contemplation of the divorce proceedings, the Defendant and Plaintiff entered into a stipulation and agreement dividing
between them their joint properties accumulated as a
result of their joint efforts as husband and w.Je (R. 4-10,
Vol. 1). The portion of that agreement with which we are
here in this action concerned reads as follows:
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the
net sales price of this property hereby and herewith given to the Defendant, Lal\Iar Anderson,
shall be placed in trust with a trust company
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the
parties hereto, and that said orie-half (%.) of
net sales price, less the costs of disbursements
and handling of the same to be paid by said trust
con1pany, is to be paid directly to the said Florence Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of
providing support money for the minor children
of the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars $(250.00) shall be made until
the said one-half of said net sales price has been
paid to the Plaintiff herein. TVhen saiil one-half
of said net sales price of said property has been
fully paid to tlle Plaintiff as here·in provided,
the Defendant, Lalllar . A.nderson~ shall then comnlence to pay to the Plaintiff, Florence Anderson,
I he s1un of Tu~o Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per
JJ/.onth for the care, support and nwi·nter~ance of
the Jni·nor children herc1~n. ·· (R. S, \Tol. 1) (Enlpha~it' added)
2
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The real property above referred to was situated
in Phoenix, Arizona, and consists of motel rental units;
at all times hereinafter mentioned and during all of the
proceedings in the court below, said property remained
unsold and the wife had possession thereof and received
the income therefrom.
The stipulation and agreement of the parties hereinabove referred to was incorporated into and became
a part of the decree of divorce, wherein it was ordered:
"And it is further ordered that the provisions
of said stipulation and each rund every one of
them ,be and the same hereby are incorporated
into this decree by this referenee and 1nade a
part hereof and that each of said parties receive
the respective shares agreed upon therein and that
each perform the respective obligations imposed
upon each therein and that the support of the
minor children of the parties be paid as provided
therein." (R. 16, Vol. 1.) (En1phasis added)

On or about the 11th day of August, 19'52, Plaintiff
filed in the Third J udicitl District Court a petition for
order to show cause (R. 17, Vol. 1) in which the Plaintiff alleged :
"That pursuant to said decree Plaintiff was
awarded $200.00 per month for the care, support
and maintenance of the minor children of the
parties. That since the entering of said decree,
and up to and including the lOth day of August,
1952, there was due and owing to Plaintiff, under
the said decree for the support, care and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, the
sum of $7,000.00."
3
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Order to show cause issued (R. 19, Vol. 1). The
Defendant cross-petitioned (R. 21, Vol. 1) and alleged:
"Defendant alleges that under the Decree
payments for support are not due to the Plaintiff at this time since the Decree provides that
a certain property was to be sold by either of
the parties and one half of the net proceeds of
the sale applied to the support of the children at
the rate of $250.00 per month, and that such
property has not been sold." (R. 21, Vol. 1)
The cause argued before the court on the 22nd dav
of August, .1952·, the court_ on August 26, 1952, entered
its Findings in part as follows:
"That under the terms of the divorce decree
here~tofore entered in the above entitled action
the defendant was ordered to pay to Plaint~rt
for the support and mai·ntentnce of the four minor
-children of the parties the sum of $200.00 per
month, iJ.e., $50.00 for each minor child; that there
has accrued as such support money up to and
inclu9-ing August 10, 1952, the sum of $7 ,000.00,
of which amount the defendant has paid $2,515.00,
that there is now due and owing to Plaintiff by
Defendtnt back support money in the sum of
$4,484.41." (R. 24, Vol. 1) (En1phasis added)

On the date last above 1nentioned the court then
made its order and decreed, the pertinent part of which
is as follows:
"1. That plaintiff be and she is hereby
awarded judgment against defendant for back
support money in the sum of $4,484.41, for $125.00
attorney's fees and costs.
"2.

That the property described in para4
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graph 3, subsection (c) of the Stipulation and
Agreement specif~cally incorporated in the divorce decree be sold as soon .as possiJble. (Emphasis added)
"3. That defendant is hereby found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve 30 days
in the County Jail for hjs wilfull failure to comply
with the decree of the court; that said sentence
is hereby suspended upon defendant's compliance
with the following conditions: That defendant
pay to plaintiff the suin of $300.00 per month
commencing on the 1st day of September, 1952,
and payable on the 1st day of each and every
month thereafter until the further order of the
court; said payments to be made at the office
of the Clerk of Salt Lake County and to be allocated as follows: $200.00 per month as current
support money and $100.00 per month to apply
on the back support money." (R. 26, 27; Vol. l)
Thereafter, upon affidavit of the plaintiff, the court,
Honorable Clarence E. Baker presiding, did on the lOth
day of February, 1953, order the arrest of the Defendant for the wilful failure to comply with the order of
the court, dated the 26th day of August, 1952. (R. 30,
Vol. 1)
On May 1, 1953, the Defendant petitioned the Third
Judicial District Court to vacate its order (R. 31, Vol.
1). The matter was argued to the court and taken
under advisement on 12th day of September, 1953.
The court on the 5th day of February, 1954, ordered
the petition dismissed. (R. 37, 84, 86; Vol. 1). Defendant
appealed and this honorable court dismissed the appeal
on the ground and for the reason that the appeal had not
been taken in time and that failure to do so was juris5
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dictional and notice by the court sua sponte,_ Anderson,
vs. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P. 2d, 845 (April 26,
1955 ).
Thereafter, upon the petition of the Defendant, this
court, in the case of LaMar Anderson, Appellant, vs.
The Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Jttdge of the Third
Judicial DiJstrict in and for Salt Lake County and George
Beckstead, Defendants, issued a temporary writ preventing the imprisonment of the Defendant for contempt
for failure to comply with the Baker Decree. This Court
in said case, 5 Utah 2d 33 296 Pac. (2nd) 283, refused to
make the writ permanent but "remanded the matter to the
court_ below where the equity of confinement pursuant to
adjudication of contempt is to be deterrnined and action
taken on that determination."
On April 17, 1957, the Plaintiff again by affidavit
petitioned in the District Court of Salt Lake County for,
among other things, for judgment for alleged unpaid
support money in the sum of $11,722.11 (R. 1-3, Vol. 2).
Order to show cause issued (R. 4-5, \T ol. 2). The Defendant cross-petitioned and, among other things, alleged: that under the Decree of Divorce, support money
was not due to the Plaintiff since the decree provided the
Plaintiff was not entitled to support money until certain
property had been sold, (hereinafter referred to as the
West McKinley St. property), the proceeds divided
equally between Plaintiff and Defendant, with Defendant's half thereof placed in trust to be paid over to the
·Plaintiff until exhausted for the support of the children
at the rate of $250.00 per month, and that such property
had not been sold (R. 7-8, Vol. 2).
6
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F·urther, in the alternate, the Defendant alleged
that Plaintiff had collected the rents from the property
that such should be applied toward such amount, if any,
found due or that he be awarded damages for plaintiff's
refusal to sell (R. 8, 9, 11, 38; Vol. 2).
Also, further, that by reason of the Plaintiff's refusal to sell the property, she is estopped from asserting
any claim for support money (R. 9, Vol. 2).
And again, that the decree entered by Judge Baker
on August 26, 1952, was null and void as being contrary
to the provisions of this decree of September 26, 1949
(R. 10, Vol. 2).
Also, further, if
that while defendant
porting them, that as
ment of back support
(R. 10, Vol. 2).

any money was due and owing,
has custody of the children, supto back support money, that paymoney be fixed at $50.00 a month

It was stipulated Defendant had paid to Plaintiff
$4,931.91 since the entry of the Baker Decree on August
26, 1952 (R. 11, Vol. 2).
Since the divorce, the Plaintiff has lived in Phoenix
and at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce
on September 26, 1949, and ever since, the Plaintiff
was and has been in possession of the West Mckinley
Street property (rental units) in Phoenix, Arizona,
which according to the Decree of Divorce was to be
sold and 1f2 of the proceeds awarded to Defendant, but
to be held in trust and paid to Plaintiff for the support
of the children at the rate of $250.00 per month and
when said 1f2 had been paid to Plaintiff (exhausted)
7
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then the payment of support money at the rate. of $200000
per month was to become commence (Ro 41, Vol. 2)0 It is
and was income property consisting of seven rental units
(Ro 42, Vol. 2) 0 Plaintiff always collected the rents, appropriating the money to her use (R. 42-53, Vol. 2)0 She
testified she kept no records of the money received,
saying however that for each of the years 1950 to 1g.54
inclusive, the gross receipts amounted to only $100 to
$200 (Ro 43-53, Vol. 2), and none for 1955 (Ro 52, Vol. 2)0
She had no records for the year 1956, it being in Arizona
(Ro 52, 53, Vol. 2), however, from July, 1956 to end of
year, she received $863000, so she said (R. 54, Vol. 2) 0
During the forepart of 1956, the units were remodeled
by Plaintiff (Ro 53, Vol. 2')0 In 1947, Defendant remodeled 3 of the units at a cost of $3,500o00o (R. 140-141,
Vol. 2)o
Although Plaintiff testified she had no records of
income from the rental units, she did however keep with
care records of expenses for the years 1949 to 1952 inclusive and that, although the gross income during this
period was only from $100 to $200 per year, the expenses
for the same period was $6,293.17 (R. 55-58, 73, 71; Vol.
2') (Exhibit 4-P and 5-P - R. 71, 77; \T ol. 2). Plaintiff
paid for electricity used on the premises the last four
months of 1949 the sum of $119.19, in 1950 the sum· of
$334.18 with bills missing for three n1onths, in 1951 the
su1n of $342.73 with bills for four n1onths missing and
1952 for six months, $210.02. (R. 56-58, Exhibit 4-P,
Vol. 2).
Defendant who lived m Salt Lake City after the
8
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divorce testified that prior to the divorce, the rental units
were approximately 100% occupied all but during the
summer months, when they were 80% occupied (R. 108,
Vol. 2) ; that after the divorce in 1949, he made several
trips to Phoenix through 1952 and the units were occupied in the same percentages (R. 108-110, Vol. 2) ; that
the 7 units brought in approximately a gross income of
$250 a month, leaving a net income of approximately
$180.00 a month (R. 108, Vol. 2).
Plaintiff kept no records after the entry of the
Baker Decree. She said, "because of its provisions"
(R. 56, Vol. 2) except, she says, they have some records
after the property was remodeled in 1956.
The property is situated within a commercial zoning
area just 133 feet off Grand Ave. which is a main thoroughfare, 3 highways - 60, 70, and 89, and just across
the street from the Desert Sun Motel, which is a first
class motel (Deposition of Vern R. Quintel p. i6).
At the time of divorce, the property had a fair
market value of $15,000 to $20,000- (R.. 118, Vol. 2) although Plaintiff in this proceeding testified it was worthless at the time of the divorce (R. 58-59, Vol. 2). However, December 13, 1948, she put its value at $18,000
(Defendant offered Exhibit 3-D R. 60-61, Vol. 2) which
was refused.
In the Baker Decree of August 26, 1952, he directed
the property sold as soon as possible (R. 26-27, Vol. 2).
Plaintiff refused to sell both before and after the e·ntry
of this decree (R. 89-115-117-122-124, Vol. 2) and she
also refused to list it with a real estate broker for sale.
9
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(R·. 62., Vol. 2). She said she had a HFor Sale" sign on
the property until 1955, also advertised in newspaper
with only one inquiry (R. 86-87-90, Vol. 2). However
Plaintiff did submit an alleged offer of $19rl.20 on July
17, 1953, from her uncle, J. Standified (R. 66, Vol. 2)
for the purchase of the property (R. 88, 11-D, Vol. 2).
On July 23, 1953, counsel for Defendant submitted a
counter offer of $2,000.00 net (R. 88-90, 93-95, Vol. 2,
Exhibit 10-D) which Plaintiff refused.
In August or September, 1952, after the entry of
the Baker Decree, Defendant went to Phoenix and attempted to secure the aid of the Plaintiff's uncle, J.
Standified, to whom they owed $3,000 (one-half of which
was to be paid by each party) (R. ±to 16, \-.-ol. 2), to sell
the property, but was refused (R. 110-114, 117, Vol. 2').
Subsequently, Plaintiff's uncle sued the parties and reduced his claim to judgment and purchased the property
at execution sale on April 21, 1955, (Ex. 8-P, R. 91, Vol.
2). The Plaintiff, however, re1nained in possession and
has collected all the rents, which she has appropriated to
her own use (R. 42-53, 63, Vol. 2) and in 1956, Plaintiff
remodeled the property at a cost of $7,61±.88 on her own
initiative, without a request of her uncle, under an
agreement entered into by Plaintiff and her present
husband (R. 66, 70, 91, 164; Ex. 9-P; \;ol. 2). She testified
that she and her present husband borrowed $2,500 from
the First National Bank of Phoenix, Arizona, under a
Title I FHA Loan with which to pay for the improvements, of which they applied only $1,500 for this purpose.
The cost of remodeling was to be paid from the income to

10
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R. 66-67, 91, Vol. 2.). The Plaintiff did not pay the contractor and he filed suit for same (R. 91; Ex. 9-D; Vol.
2). She did not ask her uncle to pay the cost of remodeling, her husband saying it was hers and his obligation
(R. 164, Vol. 2). The claim was reduced to judgment and
bought at sheriff's sale by the contractor (R. 67, Vol. 2).
At the time of this hearing, the redemption period had
not expired.
Plaintiff claimed, after the sheriff's sale to her uncle,
she had no interest in the property; that her uncle was
going to give it to her children in his will ( R. 66, Vol 2).
However, her present husband, whom she married in
February, 1954, and who· since had been, with Plaintiff,
collecting the rents, testified (R. 158, 161, 163, Vol. 2) he
knew nothing of his wife's dealings and arrangements
with her uncle (R. 165, Vol. 2).
After the property was remodeled, the Plaintiff received from $2.50 to $280 a month (R. 161, Vol. 2).
The city of Phoenix has almost doubled- its population since the second World War (R. 160, Vol. 2).
The Defendant has never received a credit for the
income received from the property against any support
money obligations.
On May 16, 1957, the three younger children then
under eighteen years of age were adjudged to be neglected by their mother, the Plain tiff herein, by the
Juvenile Court of the Superior Court of Maricopa
County, State of Arizona, made wards of the court,
placed in the custody of the Maricopa County Department of Public Welfare, and placed in a foster home
11
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in Phoenix until July, 1957, when they were placed in
the custody of the De~endant, with whom they still
reside (R. 189·-190, Vol. 2) in Salt Lake City, Utah.

STATEMENT OF POINT·S
POINT I.
THE COURT E R R E D · IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REA80'N THAT
SUPPO:RT MONEY DID NOT ATTACH AND BECO·ME PAYABLE UNTIL THE WEST M·CKINLEY ST. PROPERTY HAD
BEEN SOLD, ONE HALF OF THE PROCEEDS, THE DEFENDANT'S SHARE, PLACED IN TRUS'T AND USED UP
AT THE RATE ($250.00 per month) FOR THE SUPPORT
OF HIS CHILDREN.
POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ESTO:PPED TO CLAIM ANY
SUPPORT MONEY, AS SHE FAILED TO DO EQUITY
IN REFUSING AND FAILING T·O SELL THE PROPERTY
AS PROVIDED· IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND AS
DIRECTED BY THE BAKER DECREE OF AUGUST 26, 1952.
POINT III.
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ESTO:PPED FROM
CLAIMING ANY SUPPORT MONEY BECAUSE OF HER
WILFUL FAILURE TO KEEP RECORDS OF THE INCOME
RECEIVED AND HER FALSIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT
RECEIVED AND BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S INABILITY
TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF INCOME RECEIVED
FROM THE PROPERTY.
POINT IV
THAT, IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT RENTS AND PROFITS RECEIVED FROM THE PROPERTY ARE PROPER AS OFF·
SET'S AGAINS'T SUPP'ORT MO·NEY, IF ANY.

12
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POINT V.
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THE VALUE OF THE PR.OPERTY, AND
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT
IN PLAINTIFF'S REFUSAL TO SELL THE PROPERTY.
POINT VI.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN REFUSING T'O ADMIT INTO
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT'S, OFFERED EXHIBIT 3.
POINT VII.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
HAD MADE REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO FIND A BUYER
FOR THE PROPERTY, AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO,
AND THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT COOPERATE WITH
PLAINTIFF TO SECURE A BUYER, AND THAT HE TOO·K
INCON,CLUSIVE STEPS OF HIS OWN TO SELL l'T.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERR E D IN ENTERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE REASON THAT
SUPPORT MO·NEY DID NOT ATTACH AND BECOME PAYABLE UNTIL THE WEST MCKINLEY ST. PROPERTY HAD
BEEN SOLD, ONE HALF OF THE PROCEEDS, THE DEFENDANT'S SHARE, PLACED IN TRUS'T AND USED UP
AT THE RATE ($250.00 per month) FOR THE SUPPORT
OF HIS CHILDREN.

The action commenced in the court below was by
affidav~t (R. 1-3, Vol. 2) and order to show oause, (R.
4-5, Vol. 2) based upon a divorce decree (R. 15, Vol. 1), in
which plaintiff incorrectly alleged that the said decree
provided for the payment of $200.00 per month for the
support and maintenance of the minor children of the
parties. Had the action in the court below been a petition
to modify the decree, then the court, without altering the
13
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terms of the original decree which was based upon the
facts existent at the t:lrne said decree was made, would
have been in a position to adjudicate the equities and
to give to the wife in that cause any proper relief for
which she could show entitlement. It was error for the
court below to alter the terms of the original decree by
proceeding under an order to show cause. Cody v. Cody,
4'l Utah 456, 154 P. 952. So long as an original decree
stands, the parties are bound by the terms thereof;
this court so held a husband, ( Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah
216, 198 P. 2d 233) and a wife must also be so held-.
at least until she pleads and proves a change in circumstances such as to require, in fairness and equity, a
change in the terms of the decree. Osm·us v. Osmus, supra,
and cases there cited.
We do not here contend that a decree of divorce in
which a property settlement agreement has been incorporated cannot he modified. Our law provides for subsequent changes and new orders, 30-3-5, U·CA 1953; but
subsequent changes cannot be made without limitation
and a court cannot change or modify a judgment at will.
In the instant case (R. 15, Vol. 1), the decree of
divorce provides, in part:
"4. That the plaintiff, Florence J. Anderson,
be not awarded any alimony and that henceforth
she not be entitled to any; the said plaintiff, having in her stipulation with the defendant, elected
to receive a cash award as alunony and as and for
complete settle1nent of the same as provided in
said stipulation. * * •
"6. And it is further ordered that the pro-
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visions of said stipulation and each and every one
of them, be and the same hereby are incorporated
into this decree by this reference and made a part
hereof and that each of said parties receive the
respective shares agreed upon therein and that
each perform the respective obligations ~mposed
upon each therein and that the support of the
minor children of the parties be paid as prov~ded
therein." (Emphasis added)
The stipulation and agreement (R. 4, Vol. 1),
the terms of which the court ordered the parties to com~
ply with, provides:
"5. It is further agreed between the parties,
subject to the approval of the Court, that the property described in suparagraph (c) of paragraph
3 of this stipulation shall be sold, and that either
of the parties may list the same for sale after October 1, 1949, and that the plaintiff, Florence
Anderson, may have the income from said property until the same has been sold.
"It is agreed between the parties hereto that
the one-half ( ¥2) of the net sales price of this
property shall be the sole and separate property
and money of the plaintiff, and that she receive
the same in full payment and satisfaction of any
and all present or future claim of alimony from
the defendant, LaMar Anderson, and that she
waives any and further claim to any right to
alimony.
"It is further agreed that the one-half of the
net sales price of this property hereby and herewith given to the defendant, LaMar Anderson,
shall be placed in trust with a trust company
located in Phoenix, Arizona, the name of which
to be mutually agreed upon and selected by the
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parties hereto, and that said one-half (%) of net
sales price, less the costs of disbursements and
handling of the same to be paid by said trust company, is to be paid directly to the said Florence
Anderson at the rate of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month for the purpose of providing support money for the minor children of
the parties. That said payments of Two Hundred
Dollars ($250.00) shall be made until the said
one-half of said net sales prices has been paid
to the plaintiff herein. When said one-half of
said net sales price of said· property .has been
fully paid to the plaintiff as herein provided, the
defendant, LaMar Anderson, shall then commence
to pay to the plaintiff, Florence Anderson, the
sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month
for the care, support and maintenance of the
minor children herein."
Notwithstanding the provisions of the decree and
of the stipulation and agreement as above set out, the
court below found said LaMar Anderson delinquent in
the payment of support monies in the amount of "$200.00
per month i.e. $50.00 for each minor child" from the date
of entry of the divorce decree for an accrued total sum of
$10,635.50 with interest in the amount of $3,203.13, mak-.
ing a total judgment against the Defendant of $13,838.63
(R. 203, Vol. 2). Included therein \vas the a1nount of
$4,484.41 found to be owing under the Baker Decree of
August 26, 1952 (Findings of Fact, R. 199-202, ol. :2). In
addition to the foregoing a\vard for support n1oney, the
court below awarded judgment against the Defendant to
the effect that he pay premiluns on Beneficial Life Insurance Policies Nos. 251152, 251077, and 158875 in the

'T
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aggregate amount of $1,389.48 (R. 203, Vol.· 2). From the
latter award the Appellant does not appeal and admits
owing that amount.
Separation agreements are not contrary to public
policy and they are generally enforced by the courts of
this country and of England (see 17 Am. Jur., Divorce
and Separation, Sec. 722, et seq.) ; they have been sustained by this court. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah 147,
152 P. 2d 426; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196,
111 P. 2d 792; Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d
222. Our court said, in the case of Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah
263, 177 P. 2d 731, at 733 :
"It is true that we have held that a stipulation for an alimony settlement is only a recommendation to the court-Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah
275, 139 P. 2d 222- but we did not mean by that
that it was to be given no weight at all. Absent
any proof to the contrary the lower court should
assume that the parties best know their own financial standing and capabilities, and accept their
stipulations for its face value, unless the record
before the court obviously indicates that to accept
the stipulation would not accomplish equity. To
ignore the wishes of the parties without grounds
for doing so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious
act."
The agreement between the parties should be enforced and if there is to be subsequent change or a nevv'"
order made, it must be upon proper procedure and only
after a showing by the moving party of a change in conditions since the entry of the decree. Gardner v. Gardner,
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111 Utah 286·, 177 P. 2d 743. In the case of Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528, this court held

that the right of a trial court to modify an alimony or
support money award did not extend to installr.11ents that
had accrued; it follows, does it not, that where, as here,
under the terms of the decree, nothing had become due
or had accrued, it would not be within the province of the
court to enter judgment for a sum not owing thereunder.
In the cause at bar, we do not come before this
court on the issue of the responsibility of a father to
support his children. Our cause would have little merit
if such were our contention. We readily concede that the
obligation does exist and that it is the prerogative, and
in fact the obligation, of the courts of this state to enforce such an obligation when they are properly called
upon so to do.
May we take the liberty of pointing out to the
Court that under terms of the Stipulation and Agreement between the parties heTeto and the decree of divorce, all Mrs. Pluckard need have done to commence her
entitlement to payments of support n1oney in the sun1 of
$200.00 per month by this plaintiff 'vas to sell the property in Phoenix, Arizona and to have exhausted onehalf of the net proceeds therefrom at the rate of $250.00
per month. Mrs. Pluckard's entitlen1ent to payments in
the amount of $200.00 from l\Ir. Anderson would have
immediately accrued upon the exhaustion of the funds
received from the sale, regardless of "-rhat amount of
moneys the property might have been sold for.
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POINT II.
TI-iE COURT BELOVv ERR.ED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS ESTOPPED TO CLAilVI ANY
SUPPORT MONEY, AS SHE FAILED TO DO EQUITY
IN REFUSING AND F AILil\IG TO SELL THE PROPERTY
AS PROVIDED IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AND AS
DIRECTED BY THE BAKER DECREE OF AUGUST 26, 1952.

Although it is Defendant's position that there can
be no obligation to pay support money until the property
on West McKinley Street is sold as contemplated by
the original decree and the contract of the parties, in
the alternative, he contends that plaintiff is estopped
from claiming any support money because of her failure to join in the sale of the property as decreed by
both the original decree and the order of Judge Baker
on August 26, 1952.
That Plaintiff refused to sell is established by the
great weight of the evidence, overwhelmingly so, not
only from the testimony of the Defendant to that effect,
but from the conduct of the Plaintiff and the course
of events that follow. Particularly often Judge Baker
held in August of 1952, that the payment of support
money was not a condition of the sale of the property,
Plaintiff concluded that it was not to her interest to sell
and she resisted all efforts to do so and started a course
of action to deprive the Defendant of all of the benefits
in the property.
Plaintiff made what she regarded as a token effort
to comply with the court order when she secured an offer
from her uncle for the net sum of $197.20; however, that
such was made in bad faith and that she never did
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intend to sell is unquestionably established by her conduct in refusing an offer submitted by Defendant's
attorney just six days after of $2,000 net. Had Plaintiff
consented to this sale, she would not only have complied
with the court's orders and the agreement of the parties,
but she would have removed any objections of D·efendant
to the payment of support money. She decided to
eliminate any interest of the Defendant in the property
and secure it all for herself. To do this, however, Plaintiff had to have the cooperation of her uncle and he
obliged by reducing his claim to judg1nent, which was
the obligation of both parties, each to pay one-half,
and by his buying the property in at execution sale. That
this was a fraud on the Defendant and the Court is
apparent from the fact that Plaintiff's uncle never did
take possession of the property and Plaintiff not only
continued in possession but she continued to collect and
keep all of the rents. Furthermore, in 1956, without her
uncle's consent or request, she and her present husband,
whom she ·married in 1954, on their initiative proceeded
to remodel the property under contract entered into by
them in the sum of $7,614.88, intending personally to
pay for same. To accomplish this, they secured a $2,500
loan under FHA Title I. Plaintiff n1ade no request of
her uncle to pay the remodeling obligation and he did
not do so, even though the contractor on default reduced
his claim to judgment and purchased it at execution
sale (that at the time of the hearing belo,Y, Plaintiff and
husband were still in possession, the rede1nption period
had not expired. The record doesn't disclose whether
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or not they are still in possession), as she and her
husband regarded the obligation as theirs and not her
uncle's. All of the foregoing occurred notwithstanding the
fact that the Plaintiff claimed that she had no interest in
the property. No other conclusion can be reached but
that Plaintiff never intended, particularly after the
Baker Decree, to comply with the terms of the original
divorce decree and the order of Judge Baker as to sale
of the property. In light of the foregoing, the Defendant
contends that the Plaintiff is estopped from any claim
as to support money and that his obligation regarding
same must again, as of now, be determined in view of
the fact that he now has custody of the three younger
children, supporting them as a result of their having
been taken from the Plaintiff by the Juvenile Court of
the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa, State
of Arizona and placed in the custody of Defendant and
his present wife in Salt Lake City, Utah.
This judgment, if allowed to stand, will inure, not
to the benefit of the minor children of the parties, but
rather to the benefit of Plaintiff and her present husband, contrary to rule of this court made the Larsen
case. Larsen v. Larsen (Utah) 300 P. 2d 596.
30 A. Am. Jur. p. 710 Sec. 765.
19 Am. Jur. p. 323 Sec.: 469-479.
POINT III.
IN THE ALTER.NATE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING ANY SUPPORT MONEY BECAUSE O·F HER
WILFUL FAILURE TO KEEP RECORDS OF THE INCOME
RECEIVED AND HER FALSIFICATION OF THE AMOUNT
RECEIVED AND BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S INABILITY
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TO DETER.MINE THE AMO·UNT O·F INCO·l\tiE R.ECEIVED
FROM THE PROPERTY.
POINT IV
THAT, IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILING ~~o FIND THAT RENTS AND PROFITS RECEIVE.D FROM THE PROPERTY ARE PROPER AS OFFSETS AGAINST SUPPORT MONEY, IF ANY.

Points 3 and 4 are so related that they will be discussed together. In the alternate, the Defendant contends
that if the court is to make a new contract as to property
and hold that payment of support money is not conditioned on the sale of the property, that the contract
should be construed as to allow the Defendant a credit
for the net amount of the income received from rents
for the property by the Plaintiff, which she always collected and used, and as this cannot be determined because
of her failure to keep or produce records as to income and
her falsification of the amount received, that she should
be estopped from climing any support money, or at the
very minimum that the Defendant should receive credit
of $180, per month, that a1nount being the fair net
monthly rental value of the units.
Up to the date of the Baker Decree of August 26,
1952, Plaintiff kept a record of the expenses incurred
in the operation of the property \Vhich she says an1ounted
to $6,293.17, and that, although she had no records of
income, and she said that during the same period the
income amounted to only $100-$200 a year, and that although she had few tenants, tl1e electric charges alnounted to approximately $350.00 a year.
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In the light of this e.i. failure to keep records and
failure to disclose truthfully the amount of income thus
preventing the court from determining the amount of
income from the property, she ought to be estopped from
claiming any support money, particularly since she has
always collected the rents from the property ~nd at the
very minimum the Defendant should be allowed a credit
of $180 per month, that being the net amount the property should have produced and this should date from the
·date of the first decree, September 26, 1949, as Judge
Baker in his decision refused to allow such, as did Judge
Larson. Plaintiff should be required to do equity.
POINT V.
IN THE ALTERNATE, THE COlJ:RT ER.RED IN FAILING TO FIND THE VALUE OF THE PROPER,TY, AND
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT
IN PLAI!~TIFF'S REFUSAL TO SELL THE PROPERTY.
POINT VI.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT INTO
EVIDENCE DEFEl'TDANT'S OFFERED EXHIBIT 3.

Points 5 and 6 are so related that they will be
discussed together.
In the alternate, Defendant further contends that
he should be allowed a credit against judgment for the
damage sustained by him because of Plaintiff's refusal
to sell the property in question.
At the time of the divorce in 1949, Defendant testified the property was worth from $15,000 to $20,000
and, although Plaintiff testified that the property was
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worthless, in 1948, in a letter to the Defendant's father,
at a time when there was no controversy bet\veen the
parties, Defendant offered "Exhibit 3 D" which was
·refused in evidence, Plaintiff put a value of $18,000 on
the property. In view of this and Plaintiff's refusal
to sell as herenbefore discussed, Plaintiff breached her
contract and Defendant has been damaged % the value
of the property, or from $7,500 to $10,000 (R. 8-9, 11,
38, Vol. 2) and he should be allowed a set-off in this
amount.
Exhibit D-3 was material and relevant, not only to
set a value on the property for the purpose of determining the damage suffered by Defendant but to show the
intent of the Parties as to the agreement to sell the
property before support money was required to be paid.
In view of the fact that Plaintiff 'Yas in possession
of the income producing property, it would support Defendants contention that it was the intent that no support
money be paid while she received inco1ne from the property.
POINT VII.
THE CO·URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
HAD MADE REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO FIND A BUYER
FOR THE PR.OPERTY, AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO,
AND THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT COOPERATE WITH
PLAINTIFF TO SECURE A BUYER, AND THAT HE TOOK
INCON,CLUSIVE STEPS OF HIS OWN TO SELL IT.

Defendant contends that, in vie'Y of the evidence
that there is no basis for the court finding that he
refused to cooperate in the sale of the property and
that the Plaintiff expended a reasonable effort to find
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a buyer and that the Defendant took inconclusive efforts
of himself.
For purpose of brevity, we call the court's attention
to our discussion under point No. 2 of the evidence
·relating to the refusal of the Plaintiff to sell the property
and of her conduct in depriving the Defendant of his
interest in it. We see no reason to belabor the point
further.
·CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Defendant submits:
1. That there can be only one construction of the
agreement of the parties which was incorporated and
made a part of the decree of divorce, namely that Defendant was not required to pay any support money
until property on West McKinley Street, valuable income
producing property, proceeds of which Plaintiff has
always received, had been sold and the Defendant's part,
lf2 of the sale price;had bee~ exhausted for the support
of the children.
2. That in any event, because of Plaintiff's failure
to sell the property, notwithstanding Judge Baker's
order, as a result of which Defendant by Plaintiff's action
was deprived of his interest in the property, that she
should be estopped from claiming any unpaid support
money that to do otherwise would be inequitable, espe. cially as any money received by her would not inure to
the benefit of the parties' children, but rather to the
Plantiff and her present husband.
3. That in the alternate, that the income received
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by Plaintiff from the property should be credited against
any obligation of the Defendant and as this cannot be
determined as these facts are solely known by the Plaintiff, which information she refuses to give, she should
be estopped from claiming any amount whatsoever or
at the very minimum, the Defendant should be allowed
a credit of $180 per ·month the net rent value of the
premises after the payment of expenses, from the date
of entry of the divorce decree to the date of this hearing.
Plaintiff should be required to do equity.
4. In the alternate, Defendant should be allowed
a credit of from $7,500 to $10,000, the amount of damage
sustained by him being, deprived of ¥2 the value of
the property, which resulted from Plaintiff's breach of
contract in her refusal to see the property.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED

L.

L.

FINLINSON

DELOS DAINES

Attorneys for Appellant
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